If you were to start with "The universe seems to be mainly deterministic" and to end with "and so free will is very possibly an illusion" I'd be totally with you
Understood. Which means a materialist believing in free will is at least a very sketchy proposition. You're just not sure it's literally impossible or completely contradictory. Doesn't bode much better for anyone trying to have it both ways, but I understand the scope of your criticism.
The problem here is that your first principle is over-stated. It is contentious to insist that "all physical matter responds to cause and effect". Yet you assert it as a 100% fait accompli. Not only do scientific exceptions & doubts concerning your statement exist, but many could feasibly impinge on our human realm. To ignore the facts and inferences contained in these schools of science, without valid justification, would truly be to exhibit 'a level of skepticism of empirical data' etc.
But it's not
my premise. The argument is "if you believe these three things, there's a contradiction." If they hedge a little, okay, the argument changes a bit. I think it presents them with entirely different hurdles, but the degree to which they can bend on that proposition is the degree to which they can avoid contradicting themselves outright.
Which is just fine. Because then the conversation shifts towards what evidence they actually have for the belief, and that's really just out of the frying pan and into the fire.
To keep things compact, here are two brief examples:
(NB I'm linking to norty reproductions of New Sci articles here. I'd encourage interested parties to pay for the original content tho, as it's a great publication )
- The Landauer-Lloyd limit strongly suggests "a fundamental limit to the precision of physics" on a universal scale - a 'fuzziness' that applies to deterministic laws. It also counters known impediments to the possiblity of 'strong emergence' - IE as yet unknown "organising principles that come into play beyond a certain threshold of complexity". In combination, this apparent physics norm, and the latter theory, open new avenues of investigation into complex systems, such as the biological, and the quantum/classical threshhold. On the former they say, with some predictive strength, that complex amino acids couldn't be derived from the universal first principles as we understand them, but may be explained by 'emergent' laws. And on the quantum threshold, they posit a (as yet untestable) possibility that "the transition from quantum to classical might occur... at about 400 particles".
- Researchers Kofler and Brukner are among those investigating 'bigger Schrödinger cats' - IE nigh-'classical' physics objects exhibiting quantum behaviour. They have gone a step further by seemingly demonstrating that there is no quantum/classical threshold as such - IE "that what we perceive as classical reality can emerge gradually from quantum law" & "Reality is fundamentally quantum but looks classical to us".
I think these two alone are reasonable challenges to
100% assertions that "all physical matter responds to cause and effect". *EDIT* The 'fuzziness' of deterministic laws over deep time and the necessity of further laws to explain known phenomena are reasonable grounds for questioning assertions of their absolute primacy. And furthermore (on a perhaps dangerously new-age note
), surely a world where
quantum effects can be observed macroscopically gives one pause for thought in terms of the classical/quantum boundary.
A lot to take in here, but some observations:
1) I love that after all the stuff with will about how he's made of different stuff than rocks, and how silly claiming otherwise would sound to a scientist, the very first bit of text in the very first link says this:
"TAKE a bucketful of subatomic particles. Put them together one way, and you get a baby. Put them together another way and you'll get a rock."
Gee, how about that?
2) The things that may "kick in" at certain levels of complexity may be so, but it just barely rises to the level of hypothesis, let alone theory, let alone empirical evidence. And even then, it only posits an "organizing principle," which is more like an additional physical law, and not the
absence of a physical law that is required to create the possibility of choice. Like every attempt to talk about free will scientifically, it focuses almost entirely on whether or not behavior is theoretically
predictable, not
predetermined. That's why he starts talking about bits and entropy and what kind of calculations are even feasible.
3) It cuts both ways, too: if someone says we could discover something next that makes X seem possible, I could say we'll discover something after that that makes X seem impossible again. It's kind of a futile exercise. The only way to defend will's specific position, then, which seems to be based on mere conjecture about what could maybe happen at some point, is to admit that you don't form your beliefs based on the weight of their evidence; you just sort of arbitrarily decide what feels right and if the evidence doesn't line up, you'll just say you're holding out for more evidence. It will have avoided literal contradiction at the expense of some other absurdity.
4) While the first link is great and fascinating (and I thank you for linking me to it), I don't think it adds to the conclusion we've already reached on this topic. We're still back where we started, talking about randomness and unpredictability, but nothing that implies choice.
Also, there's a bit of a catch 22 here, because free will
can't be scientific, by definition. The only way to make it seem scientific/materialistic is to explain it scientifically. And if we can do that, that means we've found a cause and effect: a repeatable experiment that predicts an outcome. And once we've done that, we've disproven free will. QED. There's no way around it. That's why I keep saying that the question is as much a logical one as a scientific one.
(PS you should stop saying 'particles' obey deterministic laws stringently, as you have elsewhere, as that's precisely the realm where things get a bit 'fuzzy'
).
I plead guilty on the terminology. Sometimes I say particles, sometimes molecules. There's no one good term for this, I'm really just looking for "very small element that reacts to other elements." Sometimes I even say "stuff" or "something" just to avoid confusion.
It sounds like "subatomic particles" is what I'm looking for, though. I believe that's the level where the basic blocks don't differ, they're just arranged differently, yeah? Regardless, please pardon me if I name the wrong Russian nesting doll.
I was with you up until you said utility. A materliaist would struggle to claim objective morality exists, sure. But objective utility? In terms of the biological world, that's practically a building block of darwinistic thought etc.
We're not quite on the same page. I didn't say a materialist would struggle with utility; I said utility would be something they would have to demonstrate to sell an idea. Most of us will say "it's true" as a defense for arguing something, as if truth itself were intrinsically valuable and needs no added utility to be worth finding out and perpetuating. Which I believe. But in amoral, uncaring universe, truth has no
inherent value. It is only valuable as a means to some other ends.
This is particularly relevant when talking to an atheist who's trying really, really hard to convince believers not to believe. The unstated assumption behind the entire argument is that they shouldn't believe in God because it isn't true, as if that's reason enough. But by abolishing the idea of God they abolish the idea that truth is valuable in and of itself, so they actually need to go further and explain why believing in God is both false and detrimental to some other ends that both parties believe is necessary. But they usually don't. The value of truth is assumed, even though its basis has already been discarded; it's an ideological vestige, sort of the way wonder may be an evolutionary one.
What's funny here is, by this logic, none of my logic is logic. You think I should believe all logic is instinct. So why are we even having this discussion? (PS you can't predicate my mid-argument reasoning with your pre-argument conclusion. Just coz you think I shouldn't believe in logic, doesn't mean I should
)
I wouldn't go that far. Anyone--materialist, Christian, Gaia-worshipper, whatever--can exhibit logic once they assume some ends. They can always say "in order to get X, you do Y." Whether or not they can say "we ought to be trying to get X" is the thorny part.
As I've mentioned, there are logical reasons to marvel at existence in statistical / complexity terms. We could even apply them to the sunset if you like, layering in to the experience the added knowledge about the sun's staggering distance / vital role in our existence etc etc.
This just sort of goes in circles, doesn't it? Saying it's logical to feel wonder looking at the sunset because it's so grand and complex and important is just listing the things that make us experience wonder.
On the actual sensation of wonder, that's a different issue. As much as we've just mentioned Darwinistic 'utility', it's worth mentioning that is also embraces 'free rider' adaptions that might no longer play a role, or never played one at all. I've no idea if the sensation of wonder is a vestige of something that helped us survive in the past, a 'free rider' aspect of some other useful adaption, or whatever. Frankly it wasn't an argument I was making
Right, it might just be a remnant that served some purpose then and doesn't now. I'm not saying there's no materialist explanation for wonder, I'm just saying there's no materialist explanation as to how it has any purpose beyond utility. Throw love into there, too. The difference is not that there's no materialistic reason to have love, the difference is that, to the materialist, it's just a high-level instinct and/or evolutionary trait, not a thing in and of itself that has any significance outside of merely experiencing it. Even though it absolutely feels like it must.
This strikes me as an argument for another thread. You could call it "There is no reason to trust evolved thought". And I would respond to it
My thought has evolved enough that I know better than to start a fifth simultaneous argument. But it hasn't evolved enough that I can resist jumping in when it gets started by someone else. So the only question is whether or not you're going to inflict it on me.
I'm going to do a 'will' here, as I'm not sure what you mean. So I'll just say...
'Meaning has many meanings'
Aye. But you know what I
mean.
We can define meaning however we want, but then, we can define "charismatic" so that dull people get included under it, too.
All a materialist can say to notions of duty or meaning or purpose is that they don't care if it doesn't exist in the religious/metaphysical sense, because they have some substitute that they're okay with. But I see no serious argument that there's an actual materialist equivalent. There's just your own neurons, choosing to care about X. They could have just as easily chosen to make Y the purpose of their entire life, and there would be no outside standard to mediate between them. Which means it's just another arbitrary choice. And I don't think there's any normal conception of purpose or meaning that is also arbitrary.
You know what I'm on about here. It's compatibilism, but with morality: conceding the idea that the thing doesn't exist, but then saying we can define it differently, then voila!--it does.
Nope, but there are a lot of significant assumptions.
Not least of which being the one about 'conscience' having no potential role or importance in a 'materlialistic' world. One for the 'evolved thought' thread perhaps
Ah, but again: I'm talking about whether or not these things have a higher meaning, or whether or not they're just incidental. I'm not saying they have no reason to evolve. I'm saying we have no reason to treat them like they're special, or mean anything rationally, or have any significance external to us.