Standards for Film Criticism: Resources for Rational Discussion

There is still a strong relativism that pervades discussions of art. When the going gets tough, the relativist chimes in to say that these matters are hopeless, irresolvable, personal, essentially contested, etc. This is too bad, because there is plenty of rationality to be had.

There are standards to which we may appeal in basic categories descending in order of priority: Absolute, Objective, Intersubjective, and Dyadic.

Absolute

Identity, Non-Contradiction, and the Excuded middle. Without these we cannot rational discuss anything. Contradictions can prove anything and are ruled out as a matter of course. In addition, we can add in valid forms of formal reasoning. Modus Ponens is valid. Affirming the Consequent is not. Breaking these rules is a deal-breaker for discussion.

Objective

In addition to the bare-bones laws of logic, there are universal, if not absolute reasons to which we may turn. Inductive rules of reasoning also hold (e.g., typicality, tests of causality, signs), even if Hume has forever put induction on an awkward footing. In addition we can add dialectical rules which have good prima facie sense and strength, such as the principle of charity in interpretation. We might disagree about how the rule applies in a given case (how many cases before we can be assured that a generalization is not hasty?), but rule itself is secure.

Intersubjective

So far, we have not said anything about evaluating art, but this is where intersubjectivity comes in. The standards of one's time and place may be deployed as resources for evaluation. These standards offer presumptive proofs (i.e., defeasible proofs which might be overturned), but until such proofs appear, the presumptive reasons offered by intersubjective standards hold as good.

Dyadic

Worst case scenario, if two interlocutors find a shared claim in their commitment store (i.e., claims held to be true), then that claim need not be proved. Thus, it is not irrational that so many of our conversations involve sharing subjective takes with each other. Each point of agreement is a resource for both sides, be that claim factual, axiomatic, normative, etc. Of course, two people might be foolish and agree that the world is flat, so such agreements have limited application (if any) outside of the scope of a local discussion. That stated, such agreements are quite valuable in the context of an intense dyadic exchange.


If an intersubjectivity violates objective standards, then the objective standard takes precedence. In in looking for dyadic agreement someone contradicts themselves in terms of commitment, then the absolute rule of logic holds sway (i.e., one cannot play the subjectivist when caught out in a self-contradiction--at least one claim must be conceded). Thus, these categories offer a hierarchy for rational discussion.

We can and should have rational discussions about value and art. Such conversations are not easy. That is, however, why they are fun. It is the thrill of the attempt to see if any given assessment might stick.

NOTE: There is a rhetorical tendency to back away from an intractable conversation by invoking relativism. This allows both sides to save face, because no one is really wrong. As a device used to allow both parties to save face, the relativism thrust is polite. The problems begin, however, when the politeness is mistaken for a hard and fast rule that we are fooling ourselves when we talk about art. I don't believe we are.


Particular standards for evaluation are welcome below. What have you found "works" in rationally discussing art?

Lordy, only @Corax could write a long thread like this. I was lost at the first sentence.

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Tools for Resisting Relativism Pt. 1: Epistemology and Ontology (John R. Searle)

There is a mistake in inferring that because something is undecidable in a given instance, or in general (most instances), that it must be undecidable in principle. That is, sometimes the epistemological problem is conflated with an ontological limit. If grandma, for example, can't remember the name of her elementary school, this is a practical (epistemic) problem. If we don't have good records and she can't remember, then we don't know. We may never know. However, this does not mean that the matter is undecidable, in principle or that we must conclude that talk about her early education is meaningless or that we must assume that she didn't attend elementary school.

What is obvious in the real world, unfortunately, is not always so obvious in criticism. Searle (1994) writes, "the standard mistake is to suppose that lack of evidence, that is, our ignorance, shows indeterminacy in principle. I have been amazed to see how often this mistake is made" (p. 648). In debates about author intention, for example, the difficulty about knowing the maker's intention is often asserted to be a metaphysical limit with critics arguing that one simply cannot know the intention of an artist.

This thread needs more Stirchley.

Art is a social construct.

It is a human construct. All societies have art; there is no society which does not. Artistic expression runs deeper than the contingencies of the social. It is not some accidental invention of "a" society. It is a human universal. As such, it reflects conditions of human flourishing which can be described objectively.

I will concede your point. Because I think it was made in the movie Castaway (where Tom Hanks was all alone)! But still, there may not have ever been a "Wilson" if not for the social upbringing Hanks' character was brought up in.

His wife's name is Wilson. Take from that what you will.

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Tools for Resisting Relativism Pt. 2: Finding the Universal in the Particular (The more things change, the more they stay the same)

There is a difference between the principle and the application of a principle. A principle may be universal (or near to universal as we might hope) and find difference applications. Herodotus (430 B.C.E.) reports an apparent case of relative cultural practices. King Darious found that the Greeks burned their dead and that the Callatians ate their dead, with both tribes abhorred at the thought of the other's practice. However, although the practice varied, a human universal trait underwrote both (e.g., honoring the dead in ritual). There is a universal truth in these apparently disparate particular cultural practices.

Burke would refer to various literary scenes which, although apparently different, individuate the same psychological forms. Writing of history, Gadamer would speak of the possibility of a "fusion of horizons" with the past, warning that doing things the way the ancients did it then, would be different now (as our needs are different). God Emperor of Dune offers a fictional example with "Museum Fremen," who were preserving the old surface forms of Fremen life much as a dead flower is preserved in the pages of a book. Duncan Idaho, who lived and fought with the ancient Fremen, arrives and offers these reenactors/larpers a sense of what their ancestors were really up to. To do be a true "Fremen" or "Rebel" or to be "sexual transgressive" (Burke uses the now passe example of lesbian love) today requires doing something different to individuate the same form, fusing a horizon with the work of the past. Think of all those modernizations of Shakespeare (e.g., O, West Side Story, McKellen's Richard, Romeo + Juliet). To the extent that these succeed, these are fusions of horizons. Even when they fail, we may get a sense of what was at play in the original. And even when we don't, this is an epistemic problem, not an ontological one (see above). We can still labor to discover more about a different time and improve or understanding.

The moral of the story: Even if we find an apparently incommensurate practice, we might still find a unifying principle underneath it. Thus, we have another hedge against cashing out for full-blown relativism and a resource for looking for "better" and "worse" answers to questions in art.

They say the proof of the pudding is in the tasting, but whose taste buds pronounce the proof?

Subjectivism: Everyone and No One

If we cash out for subjectivism, then everyone and no one. If you say that the Godfather is well-made and I say that it ain't, then it is true-for-you that the Godfather is well-made and it is true-for-me that it is not. And that's it. Popularity has no standing on the subjectivist account, because there is no "fact-of-the-matter" in the aggregate. 98% of people who love a film matter no more than the 2% who hate it. Everyone's opinion matters (and does not matter) equally and infinitely.

Realism: No One (but the argument by sign remains)

At the other end, there is the lingering faith in objective quality in art. This faith is only whispered or rather it gets cloaked in tortured vocabularies of taste and experience. If you believe that the artwork has objectively real (i.e., independent) quality, then (again) it does not matter what people think of the artwork. They either "get it" or they don't. Some people are right. Some are wrong. Those who see the artwork for the quality it has are "right." Popularity is out of it as a constituent property of quality, because the quality of the artwork is in NO WAY constituted by the audience's response to it. At best, a positive audience response may be taken as a "sign" of quality, if you trust the audience. Those who hold faith in objective quality do not typically have faith in popular audiences. They like mainstream stuff. They're "normies." After all, what is the point of being a fanatic film elitist if you must answer to a supreme court of schlubs who watch Michael Bay movies?

Conventional Aesthetic Relativism: The Mass

On the conventional relativist account, artistic quality is both constituted and sustained by large groups of people who converge to negotiate codes of judgment. If you've heard it said that the ONLY reason girls play with Barbies and boys play with trucks is societal standards, then you are familiar with this account. The irony of the criticism, of course, is that if this theory is true, it cannot be criticized. As Bentham said of critics of the happiness account of morality,

If you believe that beauty standards or toy preferences are purely social constructs, then there are no "right" or "wrong" cultural answers. There are just different societies with varying cultural codes. Thus, there is still lingering faith in a sort of "soul" that children must have which might also dictate their preferences in toys and which adults prefer in beauty (if we could just look past western beauty standards we could see what we really find to be beautiful).

At any rate, on this account, the great mass of the people "the mass person" does matter, because they are the hive-mind which generates quality and which are the judge of it. There are different hives and sub-hives, so there are "courts of appeal," but at bottom it's all just a matter of collective "opinion-magic" which makes things matter. To the extent, however, that we dignify this account, we also dignify popular opinion as a "sign" of quality (the reaction of popular audiences is close as we might hope to get to that mass-man who is the creator and sustainer of aesthetic quality).

Human Nature: No One (but the argument by sign remains)

If we take universals out of the heavens and place them in our human nature, then we do have hope for cross-cultural "right answers" by way of human universals that are ingrained in our bones or "germ-plasm" as Kenneth Burke was so found of saying. Artistic value, on this account, is connected to human flourishing (e.g., see "baboon butts" above). No culture can decide for themselves what is right, however, people are human beings which means that the response of human beings to art can offers sign of the code which is written into our blood and bones. If you like big butts and you cannot lie, thank Darwin, not Sir Mix-a-Lot. Thus, the data about the audience's response to a film is weak (sign) evidence about how the human form of life responds to that artwork. However, this evidence is also inflected through the filter of culture, complicating matters, as applications vary (as demonstrated by Herodotus reporting the varying ways in which people honor their dead).

On half of these accounts, the audience matters. The most radical accounts (pure subjectivism and realism) hold that the audience does not matter, but we have two views on which the audience does matter. The subjectivist account is the easiest to defend, but is the nuclear option. It is "checkmate" for rational discussion (as there are no trans-personal truths to share). The realist account, if it can be defended, offers us rational grounds for discussion (assuming that we can know the "real" - remember not to conflate epistemological problems with ontological ones), but almost no one is brave enough to nakedly defend the realist account (people usually retreat into subjectivist language when trying to defend their wine-tasting vocabularies, and years of experience and so on). Indeed, if anyone has a robust defense of a directly realist account, I'd love to hear it.

Without such proof, however, we are only left with two accounts. And on both of those accounts, the audience matters. So yes, even reports about box office have to be counted as evidence.

I agree, but I wouldn’t even know where to begin. @Corax can go all night, don’t ya know.

I commend your endeavor to furnish a lucid and cogent framework for deliberating and adjudicating art. You have elicited some intriguing points and queries that I would like to reciprocate.

First, I concur with you that there is a plethora of relativism in the art world and that it can occasionally impede meaningful dialogue and evaluation. I think that relativism can be expedient as a way of recognizing the diversity and complexity of artistic expression, but it should not be used as an alibi to eschew critical thinking and analysis. As you said, there are standards that we can appeal to in order to have rational discussions about art, such as logic, induction, dialectic, and agreement.

Second, I appreciate how you categorized the standards into four levels: absolute, objective, intersubjective, and dyadic. I think this is a propitious way of organizing the different types of reasons that we can use to buttress our judgments and arguments. However, I wonder if these categories are always unambiguous and hierarchical. For example, what if there is a conflict between objective and intersubjective standards? How do we decide which one takes precedence? Or what if there is no agreement between two interlocutors on any level? How do we resolve the impasse?

Third, I think that one of the challenges of applying rational criteria to art evaluation is that art is not only a matter of reason, but also of emotion, intuition, imagination, and creativity. Art can evoke feelings and sensations that are hard to capture or explain in words. Art can also challenge our assumptions and expectations, and invite us to see things from new perspectives. How do we account for these aspects of art in our evaluation? How do we balance rationality and creativity in our discussions?

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In some cases it is absolute, yes. If you violate an absolute standard with a lower standard, then absolute standard wins the game of "rock, paper, scissors." Rules of logic precede other rules. I don't know how to have a productive and rational conversation with someone who does not respect the law of non-contradiction.

There are more plausible exceptions, however, the lower we climb down. For example, if we are having a really hard time getting traction with intersubjective standards, but find a point of dyadic agreement, we might just "agree to agree" even if we can't find firmer proof or even if we find intersubjective proof weighing against our local agreement. So long as our agreement is taken to be nothing more than local ("Proof for Us and NOT for Them"), then we don't owe the wider community anything. At the point, however, that we broaden the discussion from our private dyad to the wider community, we will need better warrants than "Well, we both think it's a smashing idea!"

If we narrow our perspective to the more local level and waive any right to more universal pretensions we may find a lower level trumping a higher one.
As a default rule, objective standards would rate higher than more local (i.e., cultural) intersubjective standards. Human universals > local tribes.

As was the case above, however, if we are only interested in an intersubjective discussion (i.e., what people in our tribe say right now about artwork X or artistic property Y) without interest in how the artwork truly speaks to the ages (the timeless rather than the timely), then the intersubjective standard might trump the objective standard.
As a default, the higher level takes precedence.

If, however, the purpose of the discussion is local (the timely rather than the timeless), a global standard might be repudiated as non-binding or irrelevant.

Again, there are limits. If you break the basic rules of logic, I can't follow you in dyadic mutuality giving the bird to the rest of the world. Absolute standards are absolute. Objective standards generally hold with some exceptions. Intersubjective standards are permeable. The lower we climb, the more likely it is we will find agreeable exceptions.
If we're in the context of discovery or invention, then yes. Great theorists are not usually great poets. On the other hand, if we're in the context of justification (the land of criticism), then rationality takes precedence. No one wants a "rational lover" in the bedroom. However, if you want to understand the neuroscience of the orgasm or the varieties of stimulation of the clitoris likely to achieve climax, then you want a rationalist. You just don't want that person in the bedroom during the act itself. Python covered this well.

Our idiosyncratic subjective responses are like Wittgenstein's "Beetle in the Box." They're there, but they don't play a part in the language game of criticism. That which is truly ineffable cannot be expressed in words (by conceptual necessity). That which can be expressed in words is subject to rational analysis. Art criticism is fun because it allows us to surf the crest of the wave where subjectivity and rationality meet.
That's the fun of it. We picked the hard problem. Our failures are many. Our successes are few. But we do have successes. And those are treasures.

Hmm, a few questions, again;

1. You said that objective standards generally hold with some exceptions. What are those exceptions and how to resolve them?

2. How would you deal with cases where intersubjective standards may conflict with each other? For example, how would you evaluate art from different historical periods, cultural backgrounds, or aesthetic traditions? How to avoid ethnocentrism or anachronism in your judgments?

3. You said that dyadic standards can be valuable if you don't take them as dogmas. But how would you maintain a balance between dyadic agreement and critical thinking? For example, how would you avoid confirmation bias or groupthink in your discussions? How would you challenge or question your own assumptions or preferences?

So far, we have a class of exceptions which we may identify by the purpose of the dialogue and which we resolve via the purpose of the dialogue.

If the purpose of our dialogue is to arrive at mutual agreement which is not rationally binding on anyone else (i.e., dyadic), then we may reject a purely intersubjective standard, resolving the dispute in favor of our local agreement (i.e., our mutual stipulation).

Suppose we're discussing fashion etiquette. There is an intersubjective rule that stating that one should not wear white after labor day. The post–Labor Day moratorium on white clothing and accessories has long ranked among etiquette hard-liners’ most sacred rules. We feel that this rule is bullocks, so we agree we will not trouble our present discussion with this rule.

As for boundary conditions, exceptions increase the lower we go.

1. Absolute (None)
2. Objective (Some)
3. Intersubjective (More)
4. Dyadic (Most)

If we suspend the rules of #1, we are (by definition) outside the bounds of rational discussion, so exceptions begin at level 2.
Good question. Below, I shall work up to answering how to resolve a within-intersubjective group conflict. Your example (below) is a between-intersubjective groups conflict, and I will deal with it independently.

Allow me to begin with a caveat, turn to an observation, and then I'll offer a general answer.

Caveat

We're not always going to find a resolution. There should be hard cases. We're discussing "resources" for rational discussion, not perfecting art film criticism into a hard science. The nature of our subject matter denies closure. Here is Aristotle commenting on such limits in his Nichomachean Ethics:
If I were offering certain conclusions for all cases, I would argue that such a promise would be the biggest red flag of all.

That I do not purport to solve all cases, therefore, is NOT a defeater for my position, but is rather evidence that I am respecting the nature of our subject matter (ours is a hard problem).

Again, there should be hard cases.

Observation

If there is anything here which we have discussed so far which is useful, we have made progress. Therefore, we already have grounds to resist the false dilemma of

a. Either you admit that your ideas are not perfect/complete/certain

or

b. Admit that without such closure we're no better off than when we started.

We're already a little better off. Moreover, I hope that other posters will offer their own standards which we can add to our critical toolbox.

Answer

OK, so what do we do when intersubjective standards conflict with other intersubjective standards? I don't have a perfected method here, but some rules of thumb.

Look for Preexisting Intersubjective Rules for Exception. Unless we're very clever or have stumbled upon a uniquely hard case, it is highly likely that this conflict has been noticed before and that grounds for exception have already been mapped out. Those should be sought out and considered before reinventing the wheel. If we find no preexisting rules/procedures for exceptions or find that those rules are weak on objective/absolute grounds, then we should move forward.

Test for Coherence. If two intersubjective standards are in conflict, which results in the most incoherence in the overall intersubjective milieu if it is accepted or rejected? Give some preference to the standard which results in the greatest coherence where it is accepted and the other is rejected.

Test for Salience. If two intersubjective standards are in conflict, which standard is most salient to the context of discussion? Give some preference to the standard which is more salient/proximate/relevant. If salience and coherence conflict, give more weight to coherence, because a less coherent answer is less likely to align with the absolute, the objective, and the "soul" the intersubjective domain you're excavating (i.e., humans do not aim at increasing incoherence when setting up critical standard).

Narrow Your Scope. If the problem is intractable, then we might agree to narrow our scope to the level of the dyadic (the purpose of the dialogue now being mutual agreement rather than a comment about our intersubjective community. And if the two of use cannot come to mutual agreement, we might have to agree to disagree.

And I think we might proceed, basically in this order.
Presumption goes to the time and place of the artwork's production, if our purpose is to understand the artwork on its own terms. If our purpose is to understand the artwork on terms alien to that time, then presumption goes to to the alien standard (e.g., the Freudian reading of The Turn of the Screw).

A lot of mischief is caused by failing to realize that we're often asking different critical questions of "the artwork." If, however, we say we're just talking about "the artwork" or "the movie," then we can be easily misled into presupposing that everything relevant to our question is already "inside" the artwork waiting to be excavated, which causes us to forget that cultural standards (i.e., intersubjective) are constitutive.

If we are, as your example states, operating with competing intersubjective domains, then we cannot say that one is better than the other without appealing to objective and absolute standards. If we're just talking about competing intersubjective codes, then they're both "on all fours" with each other. We can't say that one is "better" than the other. Thus, we have to ask what precise critical question is being asked of it. And if we must settle a conflict between the two views, then we must appeal to absolute and objective standards to see which view performs better in terms of more timeless and universal criteria.
1. Talk to people who disagree with you. Listen to them. If you put people who disagree with you on "ignore," that might signal a brittle rigidity in your own view.

2. Recognize that the method of dyadic agreement is limited. We can bootstrap some tough problems by collapsing to mutual stipulation, but we must recognize that we have only localized the solution to our problem. When we meet a third party who does not stipulate to our agreement, we cannot beat up on that person for being "wrong."

3. Play devil's advocate. Take the other side and see if you can't really see things from that point of view for a while. You might change your mind or you might come back with a better understanding of your own view.