Young man, until you come up with an answer for quantum indeterminacy (which I went on about at
interminable length previously) you should really stop hawking this picture of materialism. It's a reduction too far.
Who're you callin' young? I've got gray hairs and a beard, and aren't you the clean-shaven one? Respect your elders, kid.
Anyway: I was waiting for this! I mentioned this in a profile comment just now, but yes, we have had this discussion before. It appears I just, I dunno,
thought about my response last time, rather than posting it. Knowing me I still have it somewhere. Here goes:
No 'materialist' (as you have been wont to call non-believers)...
Sometimes I say atheists, but as it's been pointed out to me, atheists are just usually materialists; they are not necessarily so. I like it when people are precise, so it's only fair that I make the distinction. Why, do you think I should use a different name?
...actually has to believe that 'cause and effect' as we know it has primacy over all levels of physical existence. The evidence suggests it doesn't. (I know in our previous discussion on this you said your gut made you suspect that these seemingly 'random' facets of existence merely appear that way. But gut calls aren't supposed to play a role in logical appraisals of the head
)
I'm shocked I never replied to this idea before, but I'll just do it now. I think there are two pretty clear counters to the idea that quantum indeterminacy can reconcile this problem:
1) Something being indeterminate may stop
determinism, but it doesn't necessarily create the possibility of
choice. These are almost two sides of the same coin, but not quite. It may be true that quantum indeterminacy shoots down the physical primacy of cause and effect, but it does so by replacing it with unpredictability, at least for the moment, which is no friendlier to the idea of free will. Free will requires both debunking determinism
and asserting that we exert specific control over the matter in our minds. Being at the mercy of a probability distribution gets us no closer to genuine agency.
2) Even putting the first point aside, I think you'll agree that trying to argue for free will with quantum indeterminacy bears a striking similarity to people who like to say "God did it" about anything we don't understand. The fact that the issue's a big ol' mystery could
technically be used to explain all sorts of contradictory ideas, but treating its black box nature as a get-out-of-contradiction-free-card strikes me as a technicality at best. So then the discussion merely goes from "free will isn't technically possible, given what you believe" to "you believe in free will despite having no evidence whatsoever." It's a leap of faith far beyond any religion. Even that one with the thetans.
Oh, quick edit: I should add that, if someone wanted to use this sort of argument, then they'd still be able to answer the question posed. They could say "why, I disagree with that third option, my good man. I am not at all convinced that matter responds in consistent ways."