Ron Paul 2012 Support.

Tools    





Hm. I just noticed a Ron Paul 2012 banner ad on this thread.
__________________
"Puns are the highest form of literature." -Alfred Hitchcock



I don't entirely disagree, but what you're proposing now isn't quite what Ron Paul is proposing.

And, in a very broad sense, I think it's very easy to criticize errors in intervention in hindsight. But I'm not convinced it's the kind of thing that is at all predictable. The very nature of intervention, and the number of variables involved, and the number of those variables which we do not control, implies that there might not be a way to intervene which does not produce some undesirable outcomes, and which does not open us up to some sort of criticism like this.
There is no "predictive model" (to borrow a Newt Gingrich phrase), but some quagmires can be forecasted. For example, on April 14, 1949, a U.S. State Department official privately warned that to oppose nationalist leader (and Communist) Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam would be tantamount to "follow[ing] blindly down a dead-end alley, expending our limited resources—in money and most particularly in prestige—in a fight which would be hopeless." [See Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Boston, Twayne, 1990), p. 39, 50.] But in an enormous bureaucracy where knowledge and insight often fail to flow to the top or take a backseat to power relations and overweening, misguided ambitions (both nationalistic and personal), such wisdom often goes unheeded.

Our interventions often reflect ignorance and hubris marked by the fallacy that American imperatives are readily transferable to other parts of the world. Countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, emerged not through organic development, but imperial contrivance. Therefore, when the U.S. makes heavy-handed, bombastic intrusions with the notion of rallying those peoples behind the ideals of collective nationalism and a federal government, we are employing an inappropriate paradigm born from arrogance. In Iraq, the schism between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, seemingly ignored by the Bush administration, meant that the sudden, foreign disposal of Saddam Hussein would create the explosive potential for civil war or at least nihilistic civil strife. In Afghanistan, the remote, tribal, splintered nature of the so-called society meant that any "nation-building" mission would prove implausible, as the British and Soviets learned when they falteringly left that country (not to mention previous groups that had failed, namely the Greeks, Persians, Arabs, and Mongols). American hubris, however, convinced our leaders that we could anomalously enjoy success and that the lessons of history were scarcely applicable. Indeed, these quagmires should have been easy to predict.

So while there are no guarantees, closer study of history and international affairs can produce more prudent decisions and a more cautious, limited exercise of power. A country such as America cannot ignore its homework and then hope to ace the test.



I don't think they can be reliably forecasted, and the fact that someone seems to have forecasted it doesn't really show that they can. There are plenty of people in every single administration opposing any given foreign excursion, and it will always be possible to point to them after the fact and make it appear that the situation was a good deal more foreseeable than it actually was. But of course, there are usually perfectly plausible arguments in the other direction, and sometimes those are the ones that win. It is tempting and easy to point to people with the benefit of hindsight, but how do you identify those people to begin with? And if every situation is unique (which is true), how are they supposed to help us the next time?

I doubt that our failures in foreign policy as the result of ignorance. If anything, I'd guess (for neither of us really knows) that the problem of most Presidents is sifting through the mountain of information and variables put in front of them. I don't see any serious evidence to suggest that a mountain of data or a purview of history is going to make decisions any more obvious. If anything, it could produce just as much error or decision-making. This is not to specifically argue for ignorance, but if presented with a situation with so many variables as to render forecasting it basically impossible, at that point I don't see why more data would necessarily lead to better outcomes. And if there's one thing I don't think modern Presidents lack, it's data.

"We just have to try to make better choices" may not be a very satisfying conclusion, but I'm pretty sure it's the correct one.



Yes, but as Yoda said, you're bound to have SOME misguided or mismanaged actions with an interventionist policy. Someone is always going to make a mistake or error, but trying to maintain an isolationist policy when you're the world superpower is an error in and of itself.
I don't believe in sheer isolationism, but my point is that when interventionism is practiced too flagrantly and loosely, it can prove even more costly. Just recognize how Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both constituted American "allies" in the 1980s; here is the video of Don Rumsfeld's now infamous meet-and-greet with Hussein in Iraq in 1983.



And those relationships and the power that they granted those shady individuals ultimately came back to haunt us for years to come.

Of course, Hussein likely would have never assumed power in the first place except for an American-fueled coups in Iraq in 1963 and 1968.

http://www.fantompowa.org/cia_coups_iraq.htm

Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden served as CIA agents at points in their lives.



True or false: the danger of someone turning against us after we've allied with them in some degree exists as long as we ally ourselves with any moderately significant number of people.



will.15's Avatar
Semper Fooey
Bin Laden never was a CIA agent. That is a load of crap.
__________________
It reminds me of a toilet paper on the trees
- Paula



I don't think they can be reliably forecasted, and the fact that someone seems to have forecasted it doesn't really show that they can. There are plenty of people in every single administration opposing any given foreign excursion, and it will always be possible to point to them after the fact and make it appear that the situation was a good deal more foreseeable than it actually was. But of course, there are usually perfectly plausible arguments in the other direction, and sometimes those are the ones that win. It is tempting and easy to point to people with the benefit of hindsight, but how do you identify those people to begin with? And if every situation is unique (which is true), how are they supposed to help us the next time?

I doubt that our failures in foreign policy as the result of ignorance. If anything, I'd guess (for neither of us really knows) that the problem of most Presidents is sifting through the mountain of information and variables put in front of them. I don't see any serious evidence to suggest that a mountain of data or a purview of history is going to make decisions any more obvious. If anything, it could produce just as much error or decision-making. This is not to specifically argue for ignorance, but if presented with a situation with so many variables as to render forecasting it basically impossible, at that point I don't see why more data would necessarily lead to better outcomes. And if there's one thing I don't think modern Presidents lack, it's data.

"We just have to try to make better choices" may not be a very satisfying conclusion, but I'm pretty sure it's the correct one.
Your theory seems to be that since nothing can be guaranteed or predicted with one hundred percent accuracy, we might as well not worry about the matter and just intervene as we please while the chips fall where they may. Likewise, you seem to believe that since our leaders and citizens and species prove inherently fallible, we shouldn't be too harsh on them or demand higher standards, or believe that such demands could make a positive difference. I disagree; we need to take a harder look at ourselves and improve, even if we will always fall short of perfection.

And I'm not talking about reams of misleading data, but a better sense of historical understanding and respect for the different histories and prerogatives of other peoples and countries. Clearly, ignorance has existed in these regards or the U.S. Government would not have indulged many of its risky interventions in the first place, at least not in such cavalier fashion.

Nor am I simply speaking to hindsight; as I showed in the case of Vietnam, the warnings existed years in advance. Such was also the situation with Iraq, where George H.W. Bush refused to depose Hussein in 1991 precisely for the reasons that I've cited. However, the next-generation, neo-conservative Bush White House lacked his discretion, his knowledge, or both.

As for "the perfectly plausible arguments in the other direction," they frequently exist (Libya would constitute an example), but they just as often reflect a nearly drunken desire for protecting and perpetuating power, wealth, or unrealistic idealism as opposed to a sounder rationale.



True or false: the danger of someone turning against us after we've allied with them in some degree exists as long as we ally ourselves with any moderately significant number of people.
See my previous post. The existence of inherent risk should engender greater discretion, not greater indulgence.



Your theory seems to be that since nothing can be guaranteed or predicted with 100% accuracy, we might as well not worry about the matter and just intervene as we please while the chips fall where they may.
Nope. My theory (if that's the right word) is that our failures are not generally the result of ignorance, but a product of how ridiculously hard it is to forecast these things. It doesn't follow from this that we should not try, or that we should just do random things.

Likewise, you seem to believe that since our leaders and citizens and species prove inherently fallible, we shouldn't be too harsh on them or demand higher standards, or believe that such demands couldn't possibly make a positive difference.
Nope, not saying that either. Just against pretending this stuff is easier than it is.

Nor am I simply speaking to hindsight; as I showed in the case of Vietnam, the warnings existed years in advance.
I think you've misunderstood what I said about hindsight. The hindsight is in knowing which warning or suggestion is the right one. Of course the actual warning/advice comes before the event. The "hindsight" benefit is in being able to pick that one now, today, to make your point about Vietnam, whereas at the time there were undoubtedly a chorus of competing voices, all with perfectly plausible sounding arguments.

As for "the perfectly plausible arguments in the other direction," they frequently exist (Libya would constitute an example), but they just as often reflect a nearly drunken desire for protecting and perpetuating power, wealth, or unrealistic idealism as opposed to a sounder rationale.
I'm not sure I agree with this, and I'm not sure how one would go about proving it. But I do know that if our actions in Libya have some ripple effect that leads to some terrible terrorist act in 25 years, people will be posting on holographic forums in their flying cars about how obvious it was that we should've never intervened in Libya.

See my previous post. The existence of inherent risk should exercise greater discretion, not greater indulgence.
So...true?

My question is not an argument for greater indulgence. It is simply a retort to the idea that people like Hussein or Bin Laden inherently invalidate a given foreign policy. Even the most obvious intrusions into foreign affairs carry this sort of risk with them.



Bin Laden never was a CIA agent. That is a load of crap.
How do you know?

http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHART...laden_cia.html

Regardless of whether he actually served as a CIA agent, bin Laden indisputably worked with the CIA in Afghanistan in the 1980s in the battle against the invading and occupying Soviets. One can defend that covert American mission and the relationship with bin Laden that developed, but the connection certainly existed and helped turn him into a mythic figure in the Muslim world. He then used that power, of course, to successfully turn on us in the 1990s.



Nope. My theory (if that's the right word) is that our failures are not generally the result of ignorance, but a product of how ridiculously hard it is to forecast these things. It doesn't follow from this that we should not try, or that we should just do random things.


Nope, not saying that either. Just against pretending this stuff is easier than it is.


I think you've misunderstood what I said about hindsight. The hindsight is in knowing which warning or suggestion is the right one. Of course the actual warning/advice comes before the event. The "hindsight" benefit is in being able to pick that one now, today, to make your point about Vietnam, whereas at the time there were undoubtedly a chorus of competing voices, all with perfectly plausible sounding arguments.


I'm not sure I agree with this, and I'm not sure how one would go about proving it. But I do know that if our actions in Libya have some ripple effect that leads to some terrible terrorist act in 25 years, people will be posting on holographic forums in their flying cars about how obvious it was that we should've never intervened in Libya.


So...true?

My question is not an argument for greater indulgence. It is simply a retort to the idea that people like Hussein or Bin Laden inherently invalidate a given foreign policy. Even the most obvious intrusions into foreign affairs carry this sort of risk with them.
But this sort of "blow-back" did not occur, for example, after the Second World War.

Anyway, I'm not saying that the emergence of former allies Hussein and bin Laden as arch-antagonists of America necessarily "invalidates" anything. But their existence does suggest the risks involved and the need for caution, discipline, and discretion. Indeed, Hussein and bin Laden emerge not as isolated aberrations, but flashing signposts within a seamy historical maze. Consider, for example, the following chain.

In 1953, the CIA (with President Dwight Eisenhower's approval) engaged in bribery and subterfuge to upend Iranian premier Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, who had nationalized the country's oil fields and refineries. Restored was the Shah of Iran, friendly to Western oil and economic interests along with the West's Cold War politics. But the Shah constituted a brutal dictator who committed all manner of repressive human rights violations in an effort to protect his power. Animosity towards him and understandable resentment towards the US for its covert role in the 1953 coup resulted in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in which an anti-American theocracy ascended to power. Indeed, the result proved far more threatening than what might have occurred in 1953 had the US supported Mossadegh in the first place (thus heading-off his turn to the Soviets for economic assistance) or at least refrained from the kind of intervention that would come back to haunt our nation a generation later when the Iranians grabbed American hostages and held them for over a year.

This anti-American turn at the end of the 1970s thus encouraged the US to throw its weight behind the thuggish Saddam Hussein, the new autocrat of Iran's neighboring nation to the west, Iraq. So when Hussein initiated a brutal war against Iran in 1981 that would last eight years and cost thousands of lives on both sides, he received American military support, including the chemical weapons that he used in the genocidal gassing of the Kurds (to which our government turned a blind eye). Conversely, if the US had not undermined Iran's government back in 1953, then that country probably would not have turned in such a theocratic and virulently anti-American direction a quarter-century later, in which case there would have been less incentive to support a massacring megalomaniac like Iraq's Hussein.

Emboldened and empowered by America, Hussein roguishly decided to invade Kuwait in 1990 in order to seize the tiny nation's rich oil supplies. When Saudi Arabia allowed the US (perhaps a little too eager for war) to establish military bases in the Holy Land, a maverick religious Saudi named Osama bin Laden became outraged at what he perceived as an act of blasphemy. And in part because of the CIA’s support in Afghanistan in the 1980s, bin Laden had helped lead the mujahidin guerillas to victory over the Soviet Union. Therefore, bin Laden—like Hussein—had become empowered and could attract a following within the Arab-Muslim world, leading to his successful formation of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and all the mass murders that it would commit in the coming years. One can thus trace 9/11 to Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait, which (through several steps) can be traced all the way back to the CIA-supported coup in Iran in 1953. Crossing chains of American intervention through the decades thus created a web in which terroristic monsters could thrive. And frankly, none of this intervention was necessarily necessary, instead the product of corporate economic interests (read: oil), a desire for military power and leverage, and overwrought concerns about national security. And by over-intervening constantly, the US inadvertently created the "blow-back" that resulted in far worse and far more real national security concerns years down the line.

I'm well aware that these decisions are frequently difficult (i.e. Libya), but precisely for that reason, they demand greater scrutiny, learning, and caution. Unfortunately, competing voices often don't receive a worthwhile platform or aren't considered with equal volume (the early, often buried dissent on Vietnam constitutes a case in point). Therefore, a sense of ignorance often proves pervasive, not because greater knowledge and acuity fail to exist, but because they fail to enjoy the same channeling and voicing. If they did, then America wouldn't have intervened so many times in ways that ultimately made matters worse, for us or for many people in foreign countries (who became victims of dictatorial or military oppression or of our bombs and guns). The list is long: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and on and on. So while I don’t believe in inflexible isolationism (the Nixon-Kissinger outreach to the Soviet Union and China proved commendable), Ron Paul is certainly correct to observe the fallaciousness, imperiousness, and recklessness coursing through our foreign policy history.

As for ascribing motivation for these interventions, the matter certainly comes down to interpretation and usually there are multiple motivations, inextricably intertwined and with varying degrees of self-consciousness and subconsciousness. Still, any study of history and lack of naďveté would create the awareness that power, economic ambition (often of the kind favored by corporate, wealthy interests), and unrealistic idealism have played major roles. The interventions in Iran and Iraq probably would not have occurred without the underlying bounty of oil, Iran and Afghanistan bordered the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the notion of spreading democracy behind American bombs and guns is contradictory and delusional. And certainly, what Dwight Eisenhower labeled the "military-industrial complex" during his farewell address in 1961 also explains much of the motivation for persistent American intervention.



I can imagine us someday legalizing all drugs somehow. I really could. But I really think rushing them all out is insanity.

Wintertriangles thinks that natural selection will take care of stupid humans and kill off the idiots that use the drugs - all once they're legal - but the case can really be said for the opposite. Gang violence might as well be natural selection, too.

At least - and as terrible as this may sound - drugs are contained in some way via the black market and aren't easily accessible. I don't know all of the drugs that are even out there that would become available, but I imagine that if all drugs became legal, is it possible that we might find really scary stuff on sale at 7-Eleven if all drugs became legal? And I do believe that many more people would take drugs than those who do now while it's illegal. This could have hideous consequences for society on top of what society might turn into if we even allow it. If anything should be done, the war on drugs should strongly focus on putting less people in jail who sell it illegally and more focus on educating people about drugs and about the history of drugs and why people take them. Natural drugs from the earth, like marijuana and mushrooms, should have more tolerance than anything that's concocted in a lab or whatever -- 'cause to me the real terror is when man creates those scary pills or whatever that come out of nowhere. Anything that has a deep history of killing people through overdoses needs restriction.

I mean, I might be thinking ridiculous ideas like heroin would be sale at 7-Eleven -- probably it would all be something you'd have to get that's prescription based (maybe?) But like that's gonna satisfy everyone. Even if marijuana became legal everywhere, it might be restricted and only through prescription only -- and that will still be abused.

My main feeling about all of this, though, is that it's not time for all drugs to be legalized. I know you can look at time and think, "Well, if not now, when?" and I understand, but it doesn't look like it's time, yet. We have got to reach a new plateau collectively. All of this will come to pass, but it should come to pass at the right moment. I look at Ron Paul and I don't see the right guy. But I do think that people like Ron Paul are inspiring and will send a message to people and will probably inspire the right person whenever he shows up.
Currently illegal drugs wouldn't become available at a 7-Eleven-type store because insufficient demand and stigmatization would preclude commercialization. Your fears are worthy of consideration, but again, I don't believe that most people take drugs or refrain from doing so based upon legality. I do strongly believe in anti-drug education and propaganda and if we ended the police-oriented War on Drugs, we could pour more money into drug education in the schools and in media. Indeed, we need to wage this "war" in a sensible and efficient manner that is less repressive, wasteful, and counterproductive. Creating a bogus black market that turns drugs into lucrative commodities is not the answer, for we just overflow prisons that should be used primarily to contain violent criminals and spur gang violence in which innocent people are caught in the crossfire, all the while still failing to eliminate the distribution and circulation of drugs for those who really want them. The problem with seeing gang violence as a matter of "natural selection" is that it stems not from individual choice regarding intake, but artificial market conditions created by arbitrary governmental regulation.

By the way, at the same time as I would legalize drugs, I would also stiffen criminal punishment for driving under intoxication of any kind. If individuals want to risk or abuse their own health, they should possess that right, but we must crack-down on those individuals who jeopardize the safety of other individuals and the overall public.

Ultimately, Ron Paul is too ideological—especially on economic issues—to constitute a victorious presidential candidate or even a major party nominee. The most that he could hope for would be a Ross Perot-type showing with about a fifth of the vote, but he would need to go outside the Republican Party, a prospect that he has disavowed in recent years. Yet while I don’t agree with him on everything and deem him too inflexible and impractical ideologically, much of what he says makes sense. Therefore, I welcome his continuing voice and candor amidst the national discourse.



Well, first off, you don't need to list the various ways in which these things go wrong. I'm sure most of us are aware of them, and their existence is not under dispute. So, there, I just saved you the trouble of having to type so much.

Second, if you don't really agree with Ron Paul, that kind of settles the matter, no? And it's consistent with something I notice about people who support or defend him: a striking number of them have serious disagreements with the guy. But some just dislike the idea of the status quo so badly that they're willing to tolerate someone they disagree with on major issues just to shake up the political snowglobe and see what happens.

Third. Re: military-industrial complex. That gets tossed around a lot and abused just as often. It's often used to suggest that Eisenhower was worried about war as an engine for profit, but what he was actually referring to was the revolving door between politics and defense contractors that led to the awarding of defense contractors to inferior weapons. His was a concern related to the quality of military contracts. But it's vague enough that some elements of the left have managed to appropriate it for their own rhetoric.

Anyway, we agree on the central idea: Ron Paul's isolationism is too extreme, and it's really hard to know when to intervene and when not to. We might, however, still disagree about the causes. But that's probably not resolvable.



Well, first off, you don't need to list the various ways in which these things go wrong. I'm sure most of us are aware of them, and their existence is not under dispute. So, there, I just saved you the trouble of having to type so much.
Actually, I think that most Americans are rather or completely clueless on such matters, but apparently, you aren't.

Second, if you don't really agree with Ron Paul, that kind of settles the matter, no? And it's consistent with something I notice about people who support or defend him: a striking number of them have serious disagreements with the guy. But some just dislike the idea of the status quo so badly that they're willing to tolerate someone they disagree with on major issues just to shake up the political snowglobe and see what happens.
I feel that Ron Paul speaks the truth on some issues, especially regarding foreign policy dynamics. Naturally, I'm not going to completely concur with anyone, but the gist of much of what he says (at least foreign policy-wise) is spot-on in my view.

Third. Re: military-industrial complex. That gets tossed around a lot and abused just as often. It's often used to suggest that Eisenhower was worried about war as an engine for profit, but what he was actually referring to was the revolving door between politics and defense contractors that led to the awarding of defense contractors to inferior weapons. His was a concern related to the quality of military contracts. But it's vague enough that some elements of the left have managed to appropriate it for their own rhetoric.
The text of Eisenhower's speech explicitly encompasses much more than just the awarding of defense contracts for inferior weaponry (something that he never actually addresses in that speech). I re-read it this morning and he's speaking to the possibility of American democracy becoming subordinate to a de facto military state that fosters a climate of international belligerence. Eisenhower specifically fears "the power of money," " the disastrous rise of misplaced power," and a global "community of dreadful fear and hate."



The problem with seeing gang violence as a matter of "natural selection" is that it stems not from individual choice regarding intake, but artificial market conditions created by arbitrary governmental regulation.
Well, to begin with, the "natural selection" argument isn't a tool I care to talk about here, but I feel we should not judge whatever kind of conditions have been set up by the government to determine what is true natural selection. The genes of all of the people who made it into the government, who set up the government and established all of its rules were the powerful ones that led to certain members of the human species having to grow up in certain places and enter into gangs and such -- this kind of force began a long time ago and it's going to take the right people - the right genes - to turn everything around, if it ever happens.

There is no setup for natural selection, I believe -- you don't get assigned to a certain area and try to be the best one who defeats all the others -- actually, you do, but it happens naturally - you're born into it. And people are being born into violence and gangs because of the government, because of the rules, and because of other factors as well. The human species will just have to deal with it until it is over, until it is defeated and removed from the areas.



Well, to begin with, the "natural selection" argument isn't a tool I care to talk about here, but I feel we should not judge whatever kind of conditions have been set up by the government to determine what is true natural selection. The genes of all of the people who made it into the government, who set up the government and established all of its rules were the powerful ones that led to certain members of the human species having to grow up in certain places and enter into gangs and such -- this kind of force began a long time ago and it's going to take the right people - the right genes - to turn everything around, if it ever happens.

There is no setup for natural selection, I believe -- you don't get assigned to a certain area and try to be the best one who defeats all the others -- actually, you do, but it happens naturally - you're born into it. And people are being born into violence and gangs because of the government, because of the rules, and because of other factors as well. The human species will just have to deal with it until it is over, until it is defeated and removed from the areas.
Unfortunately, politics don't really represent a meritocracy. Some politicians of power and prominence, such as Barack Obama (and Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, and Richard Nixon before him), are relatively self-made people, but nepotism and wealth are probably more predominant factors than ingenuity and intelligence (i.e. "genes"). Moreover, success in politics often depends not on intellectual superiority or even strength of character, but a willingness to appease the masses and pander to lower common denominators or else a natural tendency to reflect those lower common denominators. In politics, ironically enough, the ticket to power is sometimes to not be that smart or intellectually vigorous.



Actually, I think that most Americans are rather or completely clueless on such matters, but apparently, you aren't.
Thankfully, by the time you get to this forum a lot of the less curious folks have been weeded out. They learn pretty quick they're not really in the right place. We've got a smart bunch of people here, to be sure.

The text of Eisenhower's speech explicitly encompasses much more than just the awarding of defense contracts for inferior weaponry (something that he never actually addresses in that speech). I re-read it this morning and he's speaking to the possibility of American democracy becoming subordinate to a de facto military state that fosters a climate of international belligerence. Eisenhower specifically fears "the power of money," " the disastrous rise of misplaced power," and a global "community of dreadful fear and hate."
Re: Eisenhower's speech. The first two quotes you list are perfectly consistent with what I'm suggesting. You note he talks about the disastrous rise of misplaced power (not just power in general), and the corrupting influence of money, both entirely in keeping with his fear of business interests overriding sound military decisions. You'll notice that, in the very next paragraph after using the famous phrase, he talks about the importance of research and development, and then says this:
"Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity."
He is unmistakably worried that defense will become just another industry, subject to the same lobbying influences and watering down as every other area that government oversees.



Thankfully, by the time you get to this forum a lot of the less curious folks have been weeded out. They learn pretty quick they're not really in the right place. We've got a smart bunch of people here, to be sure.


I don't doubt it. But even with smart people, many aren't going to possess a great grasp of this kind of history because it fails to receive sufficient attention in the media.

Re: Eisenhower's speech. The first two quotes you list are perfectly consistent with what I'm suggesting. You note he talks about the disastrous rise of misplaced power (not just power in general), and the corrupting influence of money, both entirely in keeping with his fear of business interests overriding sound military decisions. You'll notice that, in the very next paragraph after using the famous phrase, he talks about the importance of research and development, and then says this:
"Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity."
He is unmistakably worried that defense will become just another industry, subject to the same lobbying influences and watering down as every other area that government oversees.
In that quotation, Eisenhower is worried not about the national defense, but rather that the defense industry and it collusion with government represents a threat to the democratic ideal of independent academic scholarship. Here is the fuller context of the quotation:

... In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, projection allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.

... we must also be alert to the ... danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. …

He feared that "a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions" and a huge "defense establishment" with million of employees could create a nexus of power and money that effectively bought-off America's democratic experiment, including its universities, scholars, scientists, and legislators. As Eisenhower explained, the premise of his speech constituted the newfound emergence of a "peacetime" weapons industry that colluded with a newly expansive defense apparatus, resulting in "The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power," with "grave implications" such as "the acquisition of unwarranted influence" in government, the academy, US society, and the world.



I know, I read the whole thing. But what part of this is supposed to contradict what I'm saying? To be worried about the state of the defense industry is to be worried about our national security.

Heck, when you say things like "the defense industry and its collusion with government," you're almost agreeing with me! This is exactly what I'm saying he's saying. He is definitely concerned about the revolving door and the favor-trading that goes on between the two. But he's worried about it as a military man who sees politics trumping sound military policy. He's not worried about the military, he's worried about what government can do to it. This is why he speaks so disparagingly about how "Federal employment" may come to dominate the nation's scholars. This is why this quote...

"Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity."

...is so salient. You're absolutely right that he worries about the relationship between defense and government. But he's worried about what government will do to defense, and not the other way around. This is why he makes several references to the way the political process snuffs out innovation, and no reference to wars for profit or, as far as I can see, any explicit references to the military becoming far too large. To the contrary, he trumpets the size and strength of the military and says it must always be "mighty."

At one point you even specifically quote the line "permanent armaments industry of vast proportions" in order to make your point, but the context of that line is that he says we've been "compelled" to do so. He's not saying it in a negative fashion, so it can't be cited for the conclusion you make in the rest of the sentence.



Ron Paul has my vote. I've been a Ron Paul supporter for years.
__________________
Imagine an eye unruled by man-made laws of perspective, an eye unprejudiced by compositional logic, an eye which does not respond to the name of everything but which must know each object encountered in life through an adventure of perception. How many colors are there in a field of grass to the crawling baby unaware of 'Green'?

-Stan Brakhage